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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
DELORES E. GREN, individually 
and as Guardian Ad Litem of Gordon 
V. Gren, Geraldine Gren, and Vivian 
Gren, minor children of Melvin V. 
Gren, Deceased, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
PRESTON L. NORTON and M. 
NORTON 
Defendants and Appellants. 
CASE 
NO. 7341 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs are referred to herein as the plaintiff or as 
respondents. Melvin V. Gren is referred to as the deceased. 
Defendants Preston L. Norton and M. Norton are referred 
to by name or as the defendants or as appellants. 
Respondents agree with the fact statements contained 
in appellants' Brief, in so far as they relate to the physical 
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features of the intersection at which the collision occurred. 
Many other citations of fact set forth in appellants' 
Brief are also satisfactory to respondent. Numerous other 
citations of fact therein contained are either without proper 
foundation in the transcript or are contrary to other evi-
dence presented at the trial. 
In order to avoid great duplicity, due largely to the 
number and the arrangement of appellants' assignments of 
error, the respondents have set forth the facts upon which 
they rely, together with the transcript citation thereof, in 
the argument under the respective assignments of error. 
ERROR NO.1 
Order Overruling Defendant's Motion for a Directed Ver-
dict 
The appellants have asserted nine grounds for their 
motion. Grounds Nos. 1, 2, and 3 appear to be without any 
merit Whatever, and the appellants should be deemed to so 
concede, in view of the fact they. neither argued the same 
below nor claim anything for them on Brief. 
Grounds 4, 5, 6, and 8 deal with the alleged failure of 
the plaintiffs' deceased to keep a proper or any lookout. 
The situation in the instant case differs from that in Bul-
lock vs. Luke, 98 Utah 510, 98 P (2) 350, and Hickok vs. 
Skinner, Utah, 190 P (2) 514, in that in those cases the 
plaintiffs admitted facts from which it could be said, as a 
matter of law, that they had failed to keep a proper look-
out and were therby guilty of contributory negligence. 
Here we have simply the question of whether, as a matter 
of law, the appellants, by bringing in evidence to the effect 
that the deceased was not looking to the left at a particular 
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time as he crossed the intersection, have made a prima fa-
cie showing of contributory negligence. We think they 
have not. 
Witness Paul Adamson saw the deceased stop at the 
stop sign. "I just saw the gentleman stop at the stop sign; 
and then didn't take any more notice of him." (TR-32). He 
didn't see him start up from the stop sign (TR-32), and 
didn't notice the deceased again until the deceased was be-
yond the island. (TR-26). Witness Kenneth Adamson first 
observed the deceased's car as it was "entering the easterly-
most lane of the intersection," and he had not observed 
it in the intersection prior to that time. (TR-126). The east 
edge of the most easterly paved lane of the highway was 
44 feet into the intersection. (TR-9 and Ex. 1). The wit-
ness stated that he did not continue to observe the deceased 
and that he did not know whether the deceased looked right 
or left or what the deceased did do. (TR-126). Undoubt-
edly, from his conflicting statements, the jury could reason-
ably have concluded that witness Kenneth Adamson did 
not know Whether the deceased did or did not observe the 
truck approaching. Witness defendant Preston L. Norton 
did not even see the deceased until the deceased had reached 
and was entering upon the east edge of the pavement (TR-
182), a distance of 44 feet into the intersection. (Ex. 1). 
At that time defendant Norton was 500 to 600 feet North 
of the intersection, according to witness Kenneth Adam-
son, (TR 130-132), and 250 to 300 feet according to his 
own testimony. (TR-219). Defendant Norton could see 
the deceased distinctly only when he, defendant Norton, 
had arrived at approximately the last 100 feet. (TR-204). 
The foregoing were the witnesses who testified with respect 
to the actions of the deceased as he crossed the intersec-
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tion, and it can only be upon them that appellants rely. 
From their testimony it could not be said, as a matter of 
law, that the deceased failed to keep a lookout or that he 
failed to keep a proper lookout. See Respondents' Argu-
ment and Authorities under Errors Nos. 9 and 10. 
The appellants, on Brief, emphasize their version of 
"the remarkable manner" in which deceased drove his car 
across the intersection. The speed of the car is mentioned 
as being extremely slow. Considering the speed with which 
Preston Norton approached and traversed the intersection, 
as a matter of direct comparison, we think it might well 
be said that the speed of deceased's car was slow. How-
ever, we are taught that the law requires one to proceed 
through an intersection at a reasonable and safe rate of 
speed. Some of the witnesses estimated the deceased's 
speed at from 10 to 15 miles per hour as he proceeded 
across the intersection. (TR-53). We submit that such 
rate of speed was entirely reasonable and prudent in the 
circumstances. Be it remembered that the deceased, with-
out hurrying or speeding up his vehicle, did in fact pre-
empt the intersection, and that the defendant struck the 
deceased only after deceased had reached the west dirt 
shoulder of the road. At that time the deceased had left 
approximately 22 feet of pavement that the defendant 
could have traversed with safety had he taken ordinary 
precautions. 
Appellants claim the deceased was "slumped behind 
the wheel, low in the car." But, an independent witness, 
and one whose testimony was consistent and unshaken, saw 
the deceased as deceased ,crossed the intersection and "there 
was nothing unusual" about the driver. (Wesley Carter, 
TR-51). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
The appellants make the point that shortly before the 
impact the deceased raised up and attempted to turn his 
car to the left. According to the testimony of witness Ken-
neth Adamson, the deceased raised up in the car when he 
was about 5 feet from the west edge of the concrete. (TR-
122). At the speeds at which each of the vehicles were 
traveling, the truck, at that time, would have been some 
distance north of the point of impact and at about the spot 
where the truck first veered off onto the west dirt shoulder 
of the road. It could not be reasonably inferred from the 
fact that the deceased raised up in his car that that was 
the first he had seen the defendant approaching. It is en-
tirely possible and probable that the deceased then saw the 
defendant was taking a course whkh would surely result 
in a collision. At the very least, there were several infer-
ences that could- have been drawn from the deceased's ac-
tion, and the jury was entirely free to choose between them. 
The claim by the appellants that the deceased was in-
toxicated at the time of the collision was sham. Their 
witnesses contradicted each other, and not one of the wit-
nesses would or did testify that Gren was intoxicated at 
the time of the accident. Witness Doyle Halladay testified 
that the deceased came into a service station about 2:00 
o'clock P. M. on the day of the collision, and that the wit-
ness serviced the deceased's car (TR-152); that the witness 
had had opportunity to observe men who had been drinking 
alcoholic liquor (TR-153), and he stated: "Well, he didn't 
act out of the way. H~ was always full of humor. He 
made a few wisecracks, as he always does when he came 
around. After I serviced his car, he gave me the right 
change and drove out going east on First North." Certain-
ly, the jury could readily have found from the evidence 
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that the deceased was not intoxicated at the time of the 
collision. 
In support of their motion for a directed verdict, the 
appellants, by Grounds numbered 7 and 9, argue that the 
deceased failed to yield the right-of-way to defendant Pres-
ton L. Norton. There is no evidence as to the position of 
defendant's truck when deceased entered the intersection. 
The evidence does disclose that at a time when the deceased 
had reached the east edge of the concrete portion of the 
highway, a distance of 44 feet into the intersection, defend-
ant Norton's truck was "just coming around the bend, just 
south of the river bridge," (Witness Kenneth Adamson, 
TR-132), between 500 and 600 feet away from the inter-
section. (TR-133). Under such circumstances, we think 
it cannot be said that the deceased had failed to yield the 
right-of-way or that he was, as a matter of law, guilty of 
contributory negligence in continuing to cross the inter-
section. In the following cases it has been held that the 
plaintiffs therein were not guilty of contributory negligence, 
as a matter of law, for proceeding into or across an inter-
section when the defendants' vehicles were the following 
distances away: (250 feet) Harmon v. Bay Cities Transit 
Co. (Cal.) 98 P (2) 226; (140 feet away when plaintiff was 
half way across intersection). Pline v. Parsons, 231 Michi-
gan 466, 204 N. W. 131; (150 feet) Weber v. Beeson, 197 
Michigan 607, 164 N. W. 255; (75 feet) Brangi v. Mar-
shall, 117 Conn. 675, 168 Atl. 21; (100 feet) Scurlock v. 
Peglow, Mich., 249 N. W. 35; (135 feet) McGuire v. Bram-
billa (Pa.) 170 Atl. 332; (145 feet) Ward v. Guildea (Cal.) 
186 Pac. 612; (200 feet) Dildine v. Flynn (Kans.) 227 Pac. 
340; (100 feet) Krasnoff v. Koopitman (Pa.) 175 Atl. 711; 
(V2 block) Groeschell V; Washington Choc. Co., (Wash.) 
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224 P. 19; All of these cases hold that in the circum-
stances the question of contributory negligence is for 
the jury. In Enz v. Johns, (Cal.) 296 Pac. 115, the defendant 
was approximately 100 feet to the right of the intersection 
and the above rule was applied. See also: Page v. Maz-
zei (Cal.) 3 P. (2) 11; Couchman v. Snelling (Cal.) 295 
P. 845; Wynne v. Wright (Cal.) 286 P. 1057; Keyes v. Haw-
ley (Cal.) 279 P. 647; Keller v. Waddington (Wash.) 253 
P. 646; Lee v. Stephens (Cal.) 47 P. (2) 1105. 
By the defendant's own admission, his truck was ap-
proximately 100 feet north from the intersection when the 
deceased had. passed the center island and was proceeding 
across the west paved portion of the highway. (TR- 203). 
~here there is no vehicle approaching from within 100 feet 
of the intersection, the driver can assume that no car will 
approach the crossing so rapidly as to arrive while he is 
crossing. Calhoun v. D. C. and E. Mining Co. (Mo.) 209 
S. W. 318. A motorist seeing another vehicle approaching 
the intersection 100 feet away can properly assume that 
the other car is not violating rules of prudence by exces-
sive speed and that he has plenty of time to cross. Robin-
son v. Clemons (Cal.) 190 Pac. 203; and Flynn v. Helena 
Cab and Bus Co. (Mont.) 21 P. (2) 1105; See also: Har-
rison v. Mikelson (Cal.) 32 P. (2) 162; Shelton v. Acker-
man (Cal.) 4 P. (2) 598; Taxicab Co. v. Otenritter (Md.) 
135 A. 587; Pline v. Parson (Mich.) 204 N. W. 131; Stryker 
v. Haistie (Ore.) 282 P. 1087; Lachanse v. Meyers (Vt.) 
129 A. 172; McHugh v. Mason (Wash.) 283 P. 184; Zuren 
v. Whattey (Wis.) 251 N. W. 435; Stelmach v. Saul, 50 S. 
W. (2) 721. See also: Carlin v. Worthington, 192 A. 356, 
where the court held that the driver of an automobile on 
unfavored highway was not negligent in entering an inter-
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section when the driver on the arterial highway was so far 
away that he would not arrive at the intersection before 
the first driver had cleared the highway unless he was 
speeding. 
Here the evidence shows that when the deceased was 
44 feet into the intersection, the defendant's truck was be-
tween 500 and 600 feet North of the intersection. When 
the deceased had passed the center island and had pro-
ceeded onto the west paved portion of the highway, the de-
fendant's truck was still100 feet North of the intersection, 
according to the estimate of its driver. At that time the 
deceased had, at the very most, a space of 20 feet ahead 
of him to cover in order to clear the intersection. There 
is evidence that the deceased was moving from 10 to 15 
miles per hour. The oncoming truck had to travel100 feet, 
or 5 times the distance remaining to be travelled by de-
ceased. If the deceased was travelling 10 miles per hour, 
the defendant's truck could not have reached deceased at 
the west edge of the pavement unless said truck was tra-
velling at a speed in excess of 50 miles per hour. If de-
ceased was moving at 12¥2 miles per hour, the truck could 
not have collided with him at the west edge of the pave-
ment unless the truck was travelling at a speed in excess 
of 621j2 miles per hour. At a speed of 15 miles per hour 
for deceased, the defendant's speed must have been 75 miles 
per hour. The 55-foot skid marks prior to impact and the 
179 feet of truck skid marks after point of impact, plus 
the fact that the truck pushed or dragged an automobile 
sideways for the last 179 feet, certainly points to a very 
great and excessive speed on the part of the defendant. 
In this case it can not be said that the deceased, as a 
matter of law, failed to keep a proper lookout, nor can it 
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be said, as a matter of law, that deceased was negligent 
when he failed to stop his car in the intersection. The evi-
dence clearly made a case for the jury, and the trial court 
properly refused to grant defendant's motion for a direc-
ted verdict. 
ERROR NO.2 
Order Overruling Defendant's Motion for a Non Suit 
On Brief appellants state that the argument and au-
thorities relative to the failure of the court to grant a di-
rected verdict are "in a large measure applicable." It is 
stated on Brief that at the time the motion for non suit 
was made, the testimony of defendant Preston Norton was 
not before the court and that Paul Adamson's testimony 
relative to the movement of the Gren car across the eaiter-
ly half of the intersection was not before the court. Un-
doubtedly appellants intended to refer to Witness Kenneth 
Adamson, since Paul Adamson was a witness for the plain-
tiff and had appeared at the trial only in the plaintiff's 
main presentation. 
At the time the motion for non suit was made there 
was evidence that the defendant, travelling at a great and 
excessive speed, had struck the deceased's automobile when 
it was on the west dirt shoulder of the highway after the 
deceased had stopped at the stop sign and after he had 
practically traversed the intersection. Cf: Martin v. Shef-
field, Utah, 189 P (2) 127, where the court held the evi-
dence there sufficient to make out a prima facie case. In 
Phillips v. Classen (Okla.), 219 Pac. 708, where the evi-
dence indicated that a vehicle was driven slowly across 
intersection and was struck after it had almost, but not 
quite, passed out of the intersection, by a vehicle coming 
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into the intersection at an excessive rate of speed, it was 
held that the evidence was sufficient to establish primary 
negligence on the part of the latter. In Horsley v. Robin-
son, Urtah, 186 P (2) 592, 599, the court pointed out that 
it is universally recognized that negligence may be inferred 
from the happening of the accident and the surrounding 
lrorr 
facts and circumstances where the facts are such as to lret rr 
reasonably justify such inference even though there is no :~1rno 
direct testimony to establish the exact grounds of negli- t~il.m 
gence which caused the accident. ~;1, 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, the neg- i!Ut&. 
ligence of the defendants was clearly established, not only ~o;ili 
by direct evidence, but also by the surrounding facts and !~IJJlo 
circumstances, and there was no evidence whatever that 0 do 
the deceased had been guilty of contributory ngligence. r,mn 
That the deceased had been guilty of contributory negli- (we 
gence was an affirmative defense, and the burden of so es- Wa)·t 
tablishing was upon the defendants. 
ERRORS NOS. 3 AND 4 
Alleged Error in court's 5th Instruction to. the jury. 
On Brief appellants argue that there was no evidence 
"as to many, if not all" of the grounds of negligence upon 
Which the case was submitted to the jury. 
Treating the specific grounds of negligence in the or-
der in which they are outlined on page 40 of defendant's 
brief, we point to some of the evidence in connection there-
with: 
Excessive and Unlawful Speed. 
At a point 150 to 180 feet North of the intersection 
the defendant was driving his lumber truck at a speed of 
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from 50 to 55 miles per hour. (TR-51). The speed at that 
place was 40 miles per hour. (TR-90). 
\Vithout Due Regard for and in Violation of Traffic Rules 
and Regulations. 
At a time when the deceased was approximately 44 
feet into the intersection, just at the edge of the east paved 
portion thereof, the defendant Preston L. Norton, by the 
testimony of their own witness, Kenneth Adamson, (TR-
126), was coming around the bend. (TR-131, 132). The 
truck, at that time, was between 500 and 600 feet to the 
North of the intersection. (TR-132). The jury could have 
found that the defendant was therefore not "approaching 
so closely on said highway as to constitute an immediate 
hazard" within the meaning of Title 57-7-138 of the Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943, and he failed to yield the right-of-
way to the decedent as required by that section. 
Traveling at 35 miles per hour, under the road and 
load condition at the time and place of accident, the de-
fendant's vehicle would have required from 175 to 200 feet 
within which to stop. (TR-161 and 194). At the speed at 
which the defendant was proceeding immediately prior to 
the collision the defendant actually utilized a space from 
55 feet 10 inches north of point of impact to 179 feet south 
of impact-a distance of 234 feet 10 inches, before bring-
ing his truck to a rest. ( R-62) . The wheels of his truck 
were actually locked and the tires dragged for that great 
distance, and the road was plainly marked for that distance 
by the truck tire marks. (TR-79, 80, 81). For a distance 
of 179 feet after point of impact the defendant's truck 
pushed· or dragged the automobile which it had struck, and 
then came to rest only after shearing off a 6 by 8 upright 
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that had stood in its path. (TR-78, 79, 80). Under the evi-
dence above outlined, we think it could hardly be argued 
that, as a matter of law, the defendant was driving his 
truck at a speed that was reasonable and prudent under 
the conditions then prevailing, as is required by Section 57-
7-113 (a), Utah Code Annotated, 1943. Moreover, in the 
light of the evidence above set forth, could_it be said that 
the defendant was driving at an appropriate reduced speed 
as he approached and crossed the intersection of 5th North 
and 12th West Streets as is required by subsection (c) ? 
We think not. See Richards v. Palace I.;aundry Co., Utah, 
186 P. 439, where the court pointed out that greater care 
in required in approaching intersections than between 
street crossings. These matters were all covered by the 
court's instructions numbered from 6 to 10, inclusive. In-
struction No. 5 should not be considered as standing alone. 
Failure to Keep a Lookout. 
The appellants (brief, page 17) ,state, "It will be noted 
that from the stop sign at the Northeast corner of the in-
tersection, there is a clear view for almost a mile along the 
highway extending northerly .... " You can see as far 
South coming towards the intersection as a person at the 
stop sign can see towards the North. (Defendant Preston 
Norton, TR-198). Yet, with that plain view, defendant 
Norton did not even see or notice the decedent at the stop 
sign, and did not see him at all until deceased had reached 
the east side of the concrete portion of the highway. (TR-
182). When first observed by the defendant, the deceased 
had travelled 44 feet across the intersection. (Ex. 1). Hence, 
there is evidence for the jury, and from which the jury 
could reasonably conclude that the defendant failed to keep 
a proper or careful lookout. 
fau 
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Failed to Operate the Truck So as to be Able to Stop or 
Control the Same Within a Reasonable Distance in an 
Emergency. 
Defendant Preston Norton testified that his truck was 
equipped with Westinghouse Air Brakes, (TR- 180), and 
that he first applied his -brakes when he was approximately 
100 feet north from the intersection. (TR-195). There 
seems to be no dispute but that defendant's truck traveled 
to a point 179 feet south of the point of impact. Officer 
Brandon testified that there were continuous tire drag 
marks made by the truck from a point 55 feet 10 inches 
north of point of impact to a point 179 feet south of the 
point of impact. (TR-62, 67, 73). Officer Brandon tried 
the brakes on the truck in the course of his investigation 
immediately after the accident and found that the brakes 
were apparently working. (TR-63). From the above evi-
dence it appears that the defendant's truck traveled 55 feet 
10 inches in a locked condition prior to the impact and that 
it dragged or pushed an automobile, sideways, in front of 
it for an additional 179 feet. Such was the actual distance 
required to halt defendant's truck as it proceeded through 
an intersection in Provo City. By the estimate of each of 
the defendants, a distance of 175 to 200 feet would be re-
quired to stop the truck, loaded as it was, under road con-
ditions then prevailing, at a speed of 35 miles per hour. 
We seriously doubt that any jury would, in the circum-
stances here presented, conclude other than that the de-
fendant failed to operate his truck so as to be able to stop 
or control the same within a reasonable distance. Of a cer-
tainty it was a proper question for the jury to determine. 
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Failure to Apply Brakes. 
According to defense witness Kenneth Adamson, the 
dece4ent had reached and entered upon the east edge of 
the concrete (44 feet into the intersection-Ex. 1) when the 
defendant was just coming around the bend. (TR-132). 
The bend was approximately 775 feet North of the inter-
section. (Ex. 1). Witness Adamson set the distance as be-
tween 500 and 600 feet away. (TR-133). He estimated 
that the defendant's truck was between 250 and 300 feet 
away from the intersection when the defendant first soun-
ded his horn. (TR-123). Defendant Preston Norton testi-
fied that his truck was 250 to 300 feet North of the inter-
section when he first saw the deceased, (TR-219), and that 
when he first saw the deceased he honked his hom and 
checked his brakes, (TR-186), and that at that time he 
recognized that there might be an emergency. (TR-186). 
By the term "checking the brakes," the defendant Preston 
Norton meant that it was just a precaution; ":You just hit 
the brake. You don't hit it hard enough to lock the wheels, 
but it slows you up a little bit." (TR-186). After recon-
nizing the danger at 300 feet, the defendant moved forward 
200 feet to a point 100 feet from the intersection before he 
attempted to materially reduce his speed by actually apply-
ing or setting his brakes. According to the investigating 
officer, the brakes of the truck did not lock until the truck 
reached a point 55 feet 10 inches north of the point of im-
pact. 
Steering the Truck into the Path of Decedent's Automobile 
and Onto the West Paved Portion of the Highway and 
Onto the Dirt Shoulder Thereof. 
·n~: 
: :i 
There can be no doubt but that the deceased pre-emp- tn
1 
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ted the intersection. Officer Brandon placed the center of 
the impact at a point 2 feet 9 inches east of the west edge 
of the pavement. (TR-68). Witness Wesley Carter ob-
served the actual impact of the vehicles, and he testified 
that impact occurred on the west dirt shoulder. (TR-52). 
Witness Kenneth Adamson also stated that he had observed 
the actual impact, and that it had occurred "off the ~st 
edge of the highway." (TR-120). Defendant Norton was 
100 feet north of the intersection when the deceased was 
in the act of crossing the west paved portion of the high-
way. After that Defendant Norton started edging his truck 
into the very path that was being taken by the deceased 
and went to the west just as far as he possibly could, there-
by striking the deceased after the deceased had cleared 
the paved portion of the highway, and had left a space of 
approximately 20 feet which the defendant could have uti-
lized had defendant used ordinary care and prudence in 
driving his vehicle. 
Whether, under these circumstances, the course actu-
ally taken by the defendant was the course that would have 
been taken by an ·Ordinary prudent person under like cir-
cumstances, was certainly a question for the jury. Cf: Kel-
ler v. Waddington, supra; Simmons v. Stephens, 191 P. 978; 
Roller v. Daleys, Inc., (Cal.) 28 P. (2) 345. 
ERRORS NOS. 5 AND 6 
These assignments are directed to alleged error in the 
trial court's sixth charge to the jury. 
On brief appellants object to the use of the word "con-
stantly" and to the use of the plural "intersections." Ap-
pellant cites no authority whatever. It should be noted 
that the court clarified its language used in Instruction 
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No. 6, with respect to the lookout required of the defend-
ant, Preston L. Norton, in Instruction No. 25, by using the 
words "to constantly keep a proper lookout." Moreover, 
it has been held that an instruction that a motorist was 
bound "to constantly observe the highway" did not con-
stitute reversible error. Pfisterer v. Key, Ind., 33 N. E. 
(2) 330. 
Respondent feels that said assignments of error are 
without merit. 
ERRORS NOS. 7 AND 8 
T~ assignments relate to alleged error on the part 
of the court in giving Instruction numbered 8. 
The first paragraph of the Instruction sets out the law 
applicable to a vehicle entering a through highway in prac-
tically the exact wording of the statute at 57-7-138 (a). 
Appellant's objection appears to run to paragraph 3. That 
paragraph must, of course, be read in conjunction with all 
other paragraphs of the Instruction. Paragraph 2 tells 
the jury that the deceased was not required to wait at the 
intersection if the defendant's truck was so far distant 
that there was time to cross in safety. Paragraph 3 then 
tells the jury that if they found from the evidence that the 
defendant's truck was so close to the intersection as to in-
dicate to a reasonably prudent person that by attempting 
to cross the deceased would create an immediate hazard, 
then the deceased was required to wait until the truck had 
passed through the intersection before continuing across. 
(Boldface supplied). Defendant's request numbered 7 
would not add a thing to the instruction which was given. 
We understand appellants' contention to be that the 
deceased was required to stop within the intersection if an 
no I 
ter 
tal 
tne 
~JI 
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ordinary and prudent person, under lil{e or similar circum-
stances, would have done so. That theory was certainly 
put to the jury in paragraph 3 of the Instruction in ques-
tion. 
The Instruction as given was clear and concise. It did 
not prejudice the defendant in any way. Instruction num-
bered 11 is certainly very similar to the third paragraph 
of Instruction 8, but the appellant took no exception there-
to and did not complain of it. 
By its Instruction numbered 24, the court instructed 
the jury that it was the deceased's duty in entering and 
traversing the intersection to exercise such care and cau-
tion as may be usually expected of an ordinarily prudent 
person under like or similar circumstances, and that it was 
deceased's duty to learn of the oncoming truck, to keep 
out of its way, and to avoid injury therefrom, and that if 
the jury found that the deceased failed to exercise such 
care and diligence, and that but for such failure on his part, 
if any, the accident would not have occurred, then the jury 
should find for the defendants. The appellants would not 
be entitled to instructions more favorable to them than the 
instruction herein mentioned. 
ERRORS NOS. 9 AND 10 
By this assignment the appellants allege error on the 
part of the court in respect to Instruction numbered 17. 
At the outset, the appellant concedes that the presump-
tion mentioned may exist in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, but it is then reasoned that such presumption 
"ceases to have any force where the evidence shows that 
the deceased drove his car directly into the path of an ap-
proaching truck when one glance would have permitted 
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him to have avoided the accident."' May it be recalled that 
the evidence in this case clearly shows that the deceased 
had in fact practically cleared the intersection before he 
was struck by the defendant. 
There is no evidence that is contrary to the presump-
tion that the deceased used due and proper care for his 
own preservation and protection. Witness Paul Adamson 
testified that he did not see the deceased from the stop 
sign until just prior to the accident. He did not again ob-
serve the deceased until he was entering the west lane of 
traffic beyond the Island (TR-26)". By that time the de-
ceased had traversed a distance of approximately 99 feet. 
(Ex. A). Witness Kenneth Adamson's testimony was so 
confused and ambiguous that the jury would have been 
entirely justified in completely disregarding it in its en-
tirety. In any event, there was ample evidence from which 
the jury could reasonably have· concluded that this witness 
had not observed the deceased as he proceeded through 
the intersection. The witness did not observe the deceased 
at all until deceased was entering upon the east paved por-
tion of the highway (TR-126), a distance of 44 feet into 
the intersection. (Ex. A). The witness stated that he did 
not continue to observe the deceased after he first saw him 
and he did not know whether deceased looked to the right 
or left. (TR-126). The deceased could have looked; (TR-
132). Moreover, prior to the actual impact, this witness 
moved out of the car in which he had been sitting and went 
around to the back of the car. (T'R-141). The remaining 
witness was Preston L. Norton, the driver of the truck. 
He did not know whether the deceased stopped at the stop 
sign or not. (TR-200). And he didn't see the deceased at 
all until the deceased was at the east edge of the concrete. 
~I 
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(TR-182). By this witness's own admission he could only 
have told whether the deceased was looking at a time when 
his truck was approximately 100 feet away. (TR-204). De-
fendant's truck was 100 feet north of the intersection when 
deceased passed the center island and entered on the west 
portion of the highway, (TR-203), having traversed at least 
88 feet of the intersection. 
We think it may not be said that, as a matter of law, 
there is a particular time or place, while he was traversing 
the intersection, at which the deceased was required to ob-
serve the defendant, and we know of no requirement that 
he must gaze or stare at the approaching truck. Under 
the evidence, the deceased could have seen and noticed the 
oncoming truck as he, the deceased, passed over a portion 
comprising 88 feet of the intersection which said distance 
would bring him to a point 22 feet east from the west edge 
of the concrete traveled portion of the highway at a time 
when defendant's truck was still more than 100 feet to the 
north of the intersection. The deceased assumed that he 
could clear the few remaining feet before the truck would 
reach the intersection, and whether he was guilty of neg-
ligence by reason of his having so assumed was a question 
for the jury. Appellants may not determine that for us. 
The driver was killed, and we haven't the benefit of his tes-
timony. Instead there arises a presumption that the de-
ceased driver did use due care, and that presumption does 
not fall unless and until there is direct evidence that is 
clearly to the contrary. The Instruction itself so states by 
the words "until the contrary is proved by a preponderance 
of the evidence." See Hatzakorzian v. Rucker-Fuller Desk 
Co. (Cal.) 239 Pac. 709, 714 and cases cited therein. A 
presumption of due care instruction is not rendered erron-
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eous by the fact that there are eye witnesses, when their 
testimony is not inconsistent with the presumption, Broun 
v. Blair, 80 P (2) 95, or are not in irreconcilable conflict 
therewith, Schulman v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 111 P (2) 
924. See also: Asbury v. Goldberg, (Cal.), 47 P (2) 311. 
The court in the Peters v. Lohr case stated, in part, 
"a presumption will serve as and in the place of evidence in 
favor on one party or the other until prima facie evidence 
has been adduced by the opposite party." In the instant 
case, the appellant did not make a prima facie showing by 
evidence that the deceased had not maintained a lookout 
or that he had been guilty of contributory negligence in any 
respect as alleged. 
The instruction here given was approved by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Packard v. O'Neil, 262 P. 881. ~\{. 
The court did not instruct the jury that the presump- 1!·: 
tion was to be considered along with and as part of the 
other evidence in the case. The court instructed the jury 
that the presumption was not conclusive, but that it was 
a matter to be considered by the jury, in connection with 
all the other facts and circumstances in the case, and then 
only for the purpose of determining whether the deceased 
had been guilty of contributory negligence. (Boldface sup-
plied). The respondent submits that the appellant was not 
prejudiced in any way by the Instruction in question. 
ERROR NO. 11 
Appellants allege error on the part of the court for 
permitting the jury to assess damages for the specific 
amount of the funeral expenses. 
Counsel for respondent is a little at a loss in determin-
ing how he should hanale this assignment of error. The 
lair 
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case of Morrison v. Perry, 140 P (2) 772, at 780 and 781, 
had been brought to the attention of the court and coun-
sel early in the trial. Counsel for respondent started to 
develop evidence from Witness Mrs. Gren to cover the claim 
for funeral expenses. While he was so doing counsel for 
appellants stated: 
"I might say to the court that we will stipulate 
that the changes were reasonable and that they were 
paid by Mrs. Gren, but we won't stipulate to the ad-
mission of evidence and the admissibility of that par-
ticular testimony. We are endeavoring to save time. 
We will stipulate to the expense, but not to the admis-
sibility of it." (Boldface supplied). (TR-105). 
Whereupon it was stipulated, in effect, that the funeral 
expenses were $558.50, which said sum was "actually paid 
by Mrs. Delores E. Gren." (Boldface supplied). (TR-105). 
Now, perhaps both counsel for respondent and the 
court put the wrong interpretation on the legal effect of 
the words "actually paid by Mrs. Delores E. Gren." Cer-
tainly it was intended to mean that she had borne the eco-
nomic loss and that she had not been and could not be 
reimbursed out of the deceased's estate. While the record 
does not show such fact, all of the parties and counsel knew 
that there was absolutely nothing of value in the estate of 
the decedent, and that no administrator had ever been ap-
pointed. 
If the facts and circumstances here present do not re-
move the instant case from the ambit of Morrison v. Perry, 
supra, then the decision in that case is dispositive of the is-
sue, and the funeral expense award, in the amount of 
$558.50, specially and specifically found by the jury, should 
be remitted. Such a result would be an injustice to Mrs. 
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Gren, occasioned, we think, by an apparent intent on the 
part of counsel for appellants to cause that result. 
ERROR NO. 12 
It is contended by appellants that the court erred in 
instructing the jury that the intersection of 5th West and 
12th North constituted a single intersection. 
Appellants' argument seems rather vague. At the out-
set it is stated that they do not contend that the mere fact 
of a "safety"· zone, as appellant is wont to call it, in the 
middle of the highway changed the general law applicable 
to intersections. But, in the last sentence, they claim the 
Instruction was prejudicial, since is "permits the jury to 
ignore one of the most essential physical features of the 
~ier 
intersection, so far as the defense ·of the action is con- 1tru0 
cerned." Ctar 
In Schmidt v. City Ice and Fuel Co., 19 N. E. (2) 514, 
where traffic lanes over which traffic moved in opposite ~~ill 
directions was separated by a center strip of grass or park- oa 
way, adjacent to the intersection, and movements were 1t~t. 
controlled by a signal at the far side of the intersection, ~~t. 
the Ohio Court held that the crossing was but one inter-
section notwithstanding the center strip or parkway. See 
also: Brown v. Wallace, 35 S. E. (2) 793; Holland v. Kohn, 
38 A (2) 500; and Gilman v. Olsen, 265 Pac. 439. 
The Instruction in question merely states the law with 
respect to the intersection and settles the question of wheth-
er there was one or two intersections. We do not believe 
that it would have been proper for the court to emphasize 
any particular fact, which is only a part of the evidence, in 
its Instruction. If the appellants claim that there were two 
intersections, or if they claim that the question of whether 
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or not there were two intersections was a question for the 
jury, then appellants should have come forward with such 
an instruction, and with authority in support of their po-
sition. 
It may be noted that as often as possible the appellant 
refers to the center island as a "'safety zone." A casual 
glance at Ex. 1 will clearly illustrate that the strip was noth-
ing more nor less than tapered islands so placed as to sepa-
rate north- and south-bound traffic at an intersection where 
the road curves slightly. At its widest point, the island is 
only approximately 22 feet. 
ERROR NO. 13 
Appellants contend that the oourt erred in giving In-
struction No. 23, relating to the application of the Last 
Clear Chance Doctrine. 
Courts of law resort to the Last Clear Chance Doctrine 
in all proper cases when contributory negligence is pleaded 
as a defense, and a jury is called to find the proximate 
cause. Lang v. Washington Water Power Company, 258 
Pac. 832. Whether the situation in any given case calls for 
the application of the doctrine is a question for determina-
tion by the trial court from the facts of the particular case. 
Hartly v. Lancaster, 165 Pac. 106; Burlie v. Stevens, 193 
Pac. 684; Rossier v. Payne, 215 Pac. 366, Gardner v. Union 
Oil Co., 13 P (2) 915; Johnson v. Southwestern Engineering 
Co., 107 P (2) 417; Dembiur v. Pawtucket Cabinet Com-
pany, 193 A 622. 
In the instant case, the testimony of the appellant's 
witness, Kenneth Adamson, shows that this witness first 
saw the defendant's truck as the truck was "rounding the 
bend, coming from the north, out just on this side of the 
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River Bridge." (TR-122). At that time the deceased's car, 
the Chevrolet, was onto the east lane of the highway. (TR-
132). The truck was then 500 or 600 feet to the north of 
the intersection. (TR-133). The witness first heard the 
horn of the truck slightly after he observed the truck. He 
estimated that the truck was 350 to 300 feet north of the 
intersection at that time. (TR-123). The deceased did not 
change his course or progress forward through the inter-
section (TR-125). Witness Preston N~rton testified that 
he first observed the deceased as the deceased was enter-
ing upon the east edge of the concrete portion of the high-
way and at that time he, the said defendant, was about 250 
or 300 feet to the north of the intersection. (TR-132 and 
-219). At the bottom of the hill the defendant was travel-
ling 40 miles per hour. (R-184). When the defendant first 
started fo fully apply his brakes, at a place about 100 feet 
north of the intersection, he was travelling at approximate-
ly 40 miles per hour. (TR-195). (According to the police 
officer whO/ investigated the accident, the wheels of de-
fendant's truck did not become locked until the truck had 
reached a point about 55 feet 10 inches north of the inter-
section.) Defendant Preston Norton further testified that 
when he first saw the deceased in the intersection he honked 
his horn and checked his brakes. (TR-186). At a speed of 
35 miles per hour with its then load, defendant's truck could 
have been stopped within four times its length, or 175 to 
200 feet. (TR-16 and 194). The reason that the defendant 
honked his horn and checked his brakes when he first ob-
served the deceased in the -intersection was because he rec-
ognized then that there might be an emergency. 
"Q. Well at that time, when you checked your 
brakes, you recognized that there might be an emer-
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gency, didn't you?" 
A. That is exactly right; and that is why I 
checked them. That is why I honked the horn." (TR-
213). 
Moreover, defendant Norton testified that he contin-
ued to observe the deceased from the time he first saw him 
and that the path of the deceased's car, from the time the 
witness saw it, was "directly west with the intersection 
there; and at no time did I see it falter, turn one way or the 
other, or stop, or speed up, or anything. It was one steady 
speed." (TR-188) . 
In response to the question by counsel for appellant as 
to how the driver looked as he went across the intersec-
tion, defendant Preston L. Norton replied: 
"Well, I couldn't see his face and I did observe him 
very close. All I could see, it looked like quite a heavy 
set fellow with a hat on; and he was kinda slumped 
over wheel with his head and face directly west. I 
couldn't get his attention to turn his head whatsoever. 
Q. How long did he continue in that particular 
position? 
A. All the way across it, all the time I was ob-
serving him up until practically the point of impact." 
(TR-188L 
Hence, we have here, under appellant's own evidence, 
a situation where deceased's vehicle was actually well into 
and in the process of crossing an intersection while the de-
fendant was coming towards the intersection at a distance 
of approximately 250 to 300 feet to the north. According 
to defendant, he was travelling at a speed of 35 to 40 miles. 
He recognized that the vehicle in the intersection was going 
to cross and that there was trouble ahead. He honked his 
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horn. He knew that under conditions then existing his own 
vehicle could be stopped only at a distance of approximate-
ly 175 feet. The deceased, in the intersection, did not give 
any sign of having heard the horn at all. He was entirely 
oblivious to his danger. Realizing all of this, the defend-
ant continued without any attempt whatever to slow down 
or stop until he was about 55 feet from the intersection, 
where his brakes were first locked, and then he turned off 
to the right, into the very path taken by the vehicle which 
had then cleared the travelled roadway. 
Certainly all of the elements essential to the applica-
tion of the Last Clear Chance Doctrine are here present. 
It is not necessary that the plaintiff admit negligence on 
the part of the deceased. Juznik v. Kansas City Southern :!r,. 
Railway, 199 P. 90; Independent Lumber Co. v. Leather-
wood, 79 P (2) 1052. The deceased was in a position of 
danger which he was unaware of and totally oblivious to. 
The doctrine can be envoked, not only for physical inability 
to avoid danger, but also if the plaintiff was unaware of or 
oblivious to his danger. Jensen v. D. & R. G. Ry. Co., Utah, 
138 Pac. 1185; Gardner v. Union Oil Company, supra; Cody 
v. Sanford, 207 P. 45; Mosso v. E. H. Stanton Co., Wash., 
134 P. 941; Raggio v. Mallory, 76 P (2) 660; Helma v. Brad-
ley, 56 P (2) 607. The defendant was aware of the de-
ceased's perilous position and of the impending disaster. 
By his own admission, he recognized it when he was 250 ct)i\ 
or 300 feet to the north of the intersection; but, even so, ~; 
actual knowledge of the peril it not necessary-if by acting !~n~ 
as a reasonable prudent person the defendant should have ~;a 
known. Richards v. Palace Laundry, 55 Utah 409, 186 Pac. ID( 
439. Continued movement of the plaintiff toward a place of He 
danger after a warning sound is notice that he is unaware 
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gency, didn't you?" 
A. That is exactly right; and that is why I 
checked them. That is why I honked the horn." (TR-
213). 
Moreover, defendant Norton testified that he contin-
ued to observe the deceased from the time he first saw him 
and that the path of the deceased's car, from the time the 
witness saw it, was "directly west with the intersection 
there; and at no time did I see it falter, turn one way or the 
other, or stop, or speed up, or anything. It was one steady 
speed." (TR-188). 
In response to the question by counsel for appellant as 
to how the driver looked as he went across the intersec-
tion, defendant Preston L. Norton replied: 
"Well, I couldn't see his face and I did observe him 
very close. All I could see, it looked like quite a heavy 
set fellow with a hat on; and he was kinda slumped 
over wheel with his head and face directly west. I 
couldn't get his attention to turn his head whatsoever. 
Q. How long did he continue in that particular 
position? 
A. All the way across it, all the time I was ob-
serving him up until practically the point of impact." 
(TR-188). 
Hence, we have here, under appellant's own evidence, 
a situation where deceased's vehicle was actually well into 
and in the process of crossing an intersection while the de-
fendant was coming towards the intersection at a distance 
of approximately 250 to 300 feet to the north. According 
to defendant, he was travelling at a speed of 35 to 40 miles. 
He recognized that the vehicle in the intersection was going 
to cross and that there was trouble ahead. He honked his 
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horn. He knew that under conditions then existing his own 
vehicle could be stopped only at a distance of approximate-
ly 175 feet. The deceased, in the intersection, did not give 
any sign of having heard the horn at all. He was entirely 
oblivious to his danger. Realizing all of this, the defend-
ant continued without any attempt whatever to slow down 
or stop until he was about 55 feet from the intersection, 
where his brakes were first locked, and then he turned off 
to the right, into the very path taken by the vehicle which 
had then cleared the travelled roadway. 
Certainly all of the elements essential to the applica-
tion of the Last Clear Chance Doctrine are here present. 
It is not necessary that the plaintiff admit negligence on 
the part of the deceased. Juznik v. Kansas City Southern 
Railway, 199 P. 90; Independent Lumber Co. v. Leatper-
wood, 79 P (2) 1052. The deceased was in a positi~n of 
danger which he was unaware of and totally oblivious to. 
The doctrine can be envoked, not only for physical inability 
to avoid danger, but also if the plaintiff was unaware of or 
oblivious to his danger. Jensen v. D. & R. G. Ry. Co., Ultah, 
138 Pac. 1185; Gardner v~ Union Oil Company, supra; Cody 
v. Sanford, 207 P. 45; Mosso v. E. H. Stanton Co., Wash., 
134 P. 941; Raggio v. Mallory, 76 P (2) 660; Helma v. Brad-
ley, 56 P (2) 607. The defendant was aware of the de-
ceased's perilous position and of the impending disaster. 
By his own admission, he recognized it when he was 250 
or 300 feet to the north of the intersection; but, even so, 
actual knowledge of the peril it not necessary-if by acting 
as a reasonable prudent person the defendant should have 
known. Richards v. Palace Laundry, 55 Utah 409, 186 Pac. 
439. Contil)ued movement of the plaintiff toward a place of 
danger after a warning sound is notice that he is unaware 
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of his peril, and is enough to break the reciprocal balance 
of duty, and, if it can be said that he had time to do so, 
puts upon the defendant the positive duty of avoiding an 
accident. Locke v. Puget Sound International R. and Pow-
er Co., 171 Pac. 242. There can be no question whatever 
but that the defendant could have slowed down or even 
stopped his truck within the 250 or 300 feet from the time 
he sounded his first warning and noticed that the plaintiff 
was in the act of crossing the intersection. Being on no-
tice as he was, defendant clearly disregarded the duty and 
obligation that the law has imposed upon him. See Bald-
win v. Devlin, (Kans.) 8 P. (2) 320. 
Respondent submits that the instant case is so like 
Gardner v. Union Oil Company of California, 13 P (2) 915, 
that it cannot be distinguished therefrom. The same ra-
tionale should apply here. 
The present case is distinguishable from Hickok v. 
Skinner, supra, relied upon by appellant. Here the defend-
ant, by his own admission, did in fact recognize the danger 
while still approximately 250 to 300 feet from the intersec-
tion and while he had time to control the movement of his 
truck. There the facts did not establish that the defendant 
had a clear chance to appreciate the plaintiff's predicament 
and to avoid collision. 
The decision of the court in the Hickok case was a de-
cision on the facts of that case, and while the court 
stated that the Last Clear Chance Doctrine was of limited 
application in the case of moving vehicles, the court did not, 
we think, intend to convey the idea that under no circum-
stances would that doctrine be applied in that type of case. 
We think the court in that decision reasoned that in deter-
mining whether the Last Clear Chance Doctrine applies, 
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the question is not whose negligence came first or last, but 
whose negligence was the proximate cause of the ·injury. 
The court has said that the negligence of the plaintiff, if 
any, does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the 
defendant where it appears that the- defendant by exercis-
ing reasonable care and prudence might have avoided in-
jurious consequences to the plaintiff nothwithstanding the 
plaintiff's negligence. Thompson v. Salt Lake Rapid Tran-
mt Co., 16 Utah 281, 52 Pac. 92; Hall v. Ogden City Street 
R. Co., 13 Utah 243, 44 Pac. 1046, 1049. 
Appellants complain that the complaint fails to specify 
facts which invoke the operation of the doctrine. General 
allegations of negligence, if the evidence is sufficient, will 
support an instruction on the Last Clear Chance Doctrine. 
Del Mar Garage v. Boden, 179 N. E. 729. Engle v. Bowen, 
251 P. 1108. Moreover, paragraph five of plaintiff's com-
plaint, although not specifically naming the doctrine, speci- h,\ 
fies facts which would support the application of the Last 1a; 
Clear Chance Doctrine. See: Jensen v. D. & R. G. Icy. Co., ~If! 
44 Utah 100, 138 Pac. 1185; Juznik v. Kansas City Southern 
Ry. Co., 199 Pac. 90. 
The form of the Instruction so given was approved in ~~; 
Heurich Brewing Co. v. McGavin, 16 Fed. (2) 334, 56 App. ~~ 
D. C. 389. See also: Grubbs v. Kansas City Public Service :~u, 
Co., 45 S. W. (2) 71. 
ERRORS NOS. 14 AND 15 
This assignment alleges error on the part of the court 
in giving Instruction No. 25. 'fll 
Appellants complain that there is no evidence to sup-
port a finding that the defendant failed to maintain a prop-
er lookout. Such contention completely ignores parts of ~11 
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defendant Preston L. Norton's own testimony. He testified 
that the stop sign was clearly visible from the top of the 
hill at the north of the intersection all the way to the in-
tersection. He further tesified that he did not see the de-
ceased enter the intersection at all; that he did not know 
whether the deceased had stopped at the stop sign and that 
the deceased had reached the east edge of the concrete por-
tion of the highway before he observed or noticed him. The 
east edge of the concrete was 44 feet west from the stop 
sign. Certainly that evidence alone would be sufficient to 
carry the question of whether the defendant had maintained 
a proper lookout to the jury. Cf: Dept. of Labor and In-
dustries v. Hickle, (Wash.) 96 P (2) 577. 
The duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence to 
protect another person against injury is imposed not only 
by statute but existed at common law. The evidence here 
shows that the defendant saw the deceased when deceased 
was well into the intersection and in the process of crossing 
the same at a time when defendant was far enough removed 
from the intersection so that he could have controlled the 
situation. He actually noticed the danger at that distance 
and honked his horn. He then had noticed that there was 
a person in the act of crossing the intersection and that 
knowledge made it his duty as a reasonable man to use 
reasonable care and diligence to the end that no act of his 
should injure the other driver. 
The conduct of defendant Preston L. Norton in ap-
proaching the intersection in question as he did, to say the 
least, certainly bordered on wantonness. 
The plaintiff's complaint embraces the whole conduct 
of the defendant. There is no merit in appellant's argu-
ment. See Olsen v. Kress Co., 87 Utah 5, 48 P (2) 430. 
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ERROR NO. 16 
Appellant contends that tlte court erred in refusing to 
instruct the jury in accordance with defendants' Request 
No.5. 
At page 54 of their brief appellant states: "It is not 
contended by the defendant that the mere fact of a safety 
zone in the middle of the highway next adjacent to the in-
tersection changes the general rules of law applicable to 
intersections." The appellant's theory then must be that 
if, while crossing the intersection, the deceased knew, or in 
the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that if 
he continued on across the intersection a collision would 
probably result, or, in other words, that if the defendant 
was approaching the intersection so close as to constitute ~m 
an immediate hazard, then it was deceased's duty to refrain r,~f 
from pursuing such course and to stop his vehicle. 
That theory was presented to the jury in not less than 
five Instructions. See Instructions numbered 7, 8, 11, 16 ~101 
andK ~ 
Instruction numbered 7 informs the jury that in addi- ~a 
tion to keeping a proper lookout, a driver must so control Jset 
his car as to be able to stop or turn to avoid a collision ct;ill 
with any other vehicle or person upon the highway reason-
ably within his range of vision. 
Instruction No. 8 states, "Ifuwever, if you find by the 
preponderance of the evidence that defendant's truck was 
so close to said intersection as to indicate to a reasonably 
prudent person, under like circumstances, that the deceased, 
in attempting to cross said intersection, would create an 
immediate hazard, then it was the duty of the deceased to 
wait and permit the defendant's truck to pass through the 
intersection, before _continuing across." 
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By Instruction No. 11 the jury was told: 
"You are further instructed that if you find from 
a preponderance of the evidence, that the deceased en-
tered and proceeded through said through highway on 
12th North and 5th West, at a time when defendant's 
truck, while traveling thereon, was so close as to con-
stitute an immediate hazard, then the court instructs 
you that the deceased was negligent in failing to yield 
the right-of-way to defendant's truck; and if you fur-
ther find that said negligence proximately contributed 
to the death of the deceased, your verdict should be 
for the defendants, and against the plaintiff, no cause 
of action." 
Instruction No. 16 states, in part: "If the jury be-
lieves from a preponderance of the evidence that at the 
time, place, and circumstances of his death, Melvin V. Gren 
exercised ordinary care and reasonable diligence, that is, 
such care as an ordinarily prudent person would exercise 
under like circumstances, before entering upon the through 
highway in question, and while proceeding over and across 
said Wghway, then he was not guilty of contributory neg-
ligence, and the jury would not be warranted in finding 
against the plaintiff on that ground." (Boldface supplied). 
Instruction numbered 24 provides as follows: 
"The jury are further instructed that it was the 
duty of the deceased, Melvin V. Gren, in entering and 
traversing the said intersection on the occasion in 
question, to exercise such care and caution as may be 
usually expected of an ordinarily prudent person un-
der like or similar circusmtances, to learn of the on-
coming of defendant's truck, and to keep out of its way 
and avoid injury therefrom, and if the jury should find 
from a preponderance of the evidence that the deced-
ent, Melvin V. Gren, failed to exercise such care and 
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diligence for his own safety, and but for such failure 
on his part, if any there was, he would not have been 
struck, or killed by said truck of defendants, then you 
should find for the defendants, although you may be-
lieve that the defendant, Norton, was negligent in any 
or all respects complained of by plaintiffs, and that 
such negligent conduct, if any there was, contributed 
to cause, or bring about, the injury and death of said 
decedent." 
The defendant's theory was amply presented to the 
jury. The fact that there were traffic islands separating 
north and south bound traffic has nothing to do with the 
duty imposed upon the deceased. See Hickok v. Skinner, 
supra, where there was no evidence of any such islands. 
ERROR NO .. 17 
Appellants allege error on t4e part of the court for re-
fusing to give defendant's Request No. 7. 
The deceased was not in the position of a driver who 
had stopped at the stop sign at a time when the imminency 
of collision would have been apprehended by a reasonably 
prudent person. We do not understand that the appellant 
has ever seriously so contended. The appellant's position 
is, if we understand correctly, that the deceased should 
have arrested his progress at some point within the inter-
section itself, and that the basis for such requirement was 
the imminency of collision as viewed from that point. That 
theory was presented to the jury in not less than five dif-
ferent Instructions. See respondents' brief under Error 
No. 16. The requested instruction adds nothing and was 
properly refused by the court. 
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ERRORS NOS. 18, 19, AND 20 
Appellant's final arguments are directed to alleged ,er-
ror on the part of the court in refusing to give defendant's 
requested Instructions numbered 13, 14, and 15. 
With reference to Request numbered 13, the uncontro-
verted evidence shows that although defendant Preston L. 
Norton saw the danger at approximately 300 feet north of 
the intersection, he did not actually attempt to decrease 
his speed until he was about 100 feet from the intersection. 
(TR-195), and that his brakes did not lock until he was 
about 55 feet from the intersection. He knew that 
he could, at the speed he was traveling, and with his 
load conditions, stop his vehicle only in four times its over-
all length, or in about 175 to 200 feet.. He "checked" his 
brakes at the time he first noted the danger. (TR-196). 
At the base of the hill the defendant was traveling at ap-
proximately 40 miles per hour. (TR-184). At the time the 
defenda.tJ.t started to fully apply his brakes, about 100 feet 
north of the intersection, he was going approximately 40 
miles per hour. (TR-195). Defendant was going up to 35 
miles per hour at the moment of impact. (TR-210). Hence, 
it is apparent that defendant did not materially reduce his 
speed at all. The allegation in the complaint was that the 
defendant "failed to apply the brakes of the truck in time 
to avoid the collision herei~ complained of." Obviously, 
the appellant's argun1ent is without merit. 
Defendant's request numbered 14 was also properly re-
fused. The adn1ission of defendant Preston L. Norton 
shows that the deceased was about 44 feet into the inter-
section before the said defendant first observed or noticeq 
him. (TR-182). He didn't see the deceased at the stop sign,-
and didn't know whether he had stopped or not. The stop 
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sign and the intersection were plainly visible to one ap. 
proaching from clear to the top of the hill north of the in-
tersection. This evidence alone is sufficient to carry the 
question to the jury. 
Defendant's Request numbered 15 was also properly 
refused. It could not be said that one propelling his ve-
hicle over the heavily traveled intersection in question, 
within the limits of Provo City, under such circumstances 
that he could not stop the same in less than 175 to 200 feet, 
had his vehicle under control; nor could it be meritoriously 
argued that one driving a vehicle within the confines of 
Provo City at such a speed and under such load conditions 
that the same would, and did in fact, skid 55 feet 10 inches, 
strike another automobile and push the same sideways or 
drag it for an additional 179 feet, and at the same time leave 
a solid line of brake marks for a total distance of about 234 
feet, had his vehicle under control. One glance at the pic-
tures in evidence here, showing the twisted and mangled 
condition of deceased's car, illustrates the great force with 
which it was struck-far more forcefully than words could 
describe. 
None of the charges in question could, upon the state 
of the record, have been properly submitted to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no prejudicial error in the record of the in-
stant case. The evidence clearly made a jury case. The 
jury heard the evidence, viewed the witnesses, and, except 
for the claim for damages to deceased's automobile, they re~ 
ceived the case on all of the issues, and the jury, having 
been competently and properly instructed, returned a ver-
dict in favor of the plaintiff. The respondents submit that 
.·.·a 
da 
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the court will not disturb the verdict until it is shown clear-
ly and convincingly that the defendants were deprived of 
a fair trial. That the appellants have failed to do. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALDRICH & BULLOCK, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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